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Our species possesses the peculiar ability to accumulate cultural innovations over
multiple  generations,  a  phenomenon termed cumulative  cultural  evolution  (CCE).
Recent years have seen a proliferation of empirical and theoretical work exploring
the interplay between demography and CCE. This has generated intense discussion
about whether demographic models can help explain historical patterns of cultural
changes. Here, we synthesise empirical and theoretical studies from multiple fields
to  highlight  how  both  population  size  and  structure  shape  the  pool  of  cultural
information  that  individuals  can  build  upon  to  innovate,  present  the  potential
pathways through which humans’ unique social structure might promote CCE, and
discuss  whether  humans’  social  networks  might  partly  result  from  selection














Problem-solving in populations over multiple generations
A central feature of our species is  our  unprecedented  capacity  to  develop
sophisticated cultural practices that have allowed us to colonize and permanently
occupy environments for which we are poorly suited genetically [1, 2]. This capacity
can be viewed as a form of problem-solving by which humans have successfully
solved complex ecological  challenges.  This form of  problem solving, however,  is
peculiar  in  that  it  operates  at  the  population  level,  rather  than  solely  within
individuals, and over multiple generations [2, 3]. Both traditional and more modern
technologies have not been produced by a single individual but have emerged over
centuries through incremental improvements resulting from the efforts of multiple
generations of individuals. This process - known as cumulative cultural evolution
(CCE)  -  is powered by our  ability  to selectively  learn adaptive social  information
which  results  in  the  gradual  accumulation  of  innovations,  and  can  give  rise  to
cultural traits (such as technologies) that are beyond individuals’ inventive capacities
[2-7]. 
Drawing predominantly  on  ideas from evolutionary  theory,  anthropologists,
biologists and psychologists have developed a rigorous theoretical framework that
applies  the  notion  of  descent  with  modification  to  material  culture,  and  have
investigated the role of population dynamics in the production, transmission and
maintenance of cultural traits [8-10]. An influential finding of early theoretical models
is that our social  learning abilities interact with  demography to affect CCE, and,
more specifically, that the size of the population within which cultural information is

























Recent  years  have  seen  a  proliferation  of  empirical  and  theoretical  work
exploring  the  interplay  of  demography  and  CCE,  and  demographic  factors  are
increasingly invoked to explain historical patterns of cultural changes [11-19]. While
this research has advanced our understanding of the link between demography and
CCE and opened up promising new avenues, it has also revealed a need to better
articulate empirical  research and theoretical models.  Here we present the theory,
discuss misconceptions, outline future challenges, and highlight new directions in
research on demography and CCE.
Strength in numbers
Demography has long been considered a potential explanation for cultural changes
documented in the archaeological record [20-22], but it is with the theoretical work
of  Shennan  [23] and  Henrich  [11] that  the  idea  gained  prominence  among
evolutionary  human  scientists.  The  main  idea  behind  demographic  models  of
cultural  evolution  is  that,  given  that  CCE  only  operates  when  at  least  some
information  is  transmitted  socially  between  generations  [24-26],  the  effective
population size (which depends on both population size and interconnectedness)
can  buffer the risk of losing cultural information (see Box 1). In Henrich’s seminal
model  [11],  for instance, individuals belong to a population of  constant size and
possess  a  psychological  propensity  to  learn  from  successful  individuals.  This
propensity creates a selective force that  promotes the transmission of  beneficial
cultural  traits  and  outweighs  the  degrading  effects  of  learning  errors  when

























effective  population  size  (due  to  phenomena  such  as  plagues,  war  or  volcanic
eruptions) might result in losses in individuals’ level of skills (often proxied in the
archaeological  literature  as  the  number  of  tools,  or  toolkit  complexity)  by
constraining  CCE.  Several  regional  losses  of  cultural  traits  documented  in  the
archaeological  record,  such  as  prehistoric  Tasmania,  have  consequently  been
attributed to decreases in population size and connectedness [11, 19]. Conversely,
the emergence of more complex cultural  traits have been hypothesized to result
from increases in population sizes and/or densities [13, 14]. 
Experimental tests of the relationship between population size and
CCE 
One  approach  that  has  been  used  to  evaluate  the  plausibility  of  demographic
models  of  CCE involves  lab experiments.  Typically,  participants  who are  part  of
groups of different sizes are tasked to improve a piece of technology. To date, 5
experiments from 4 different research groups provide support for a positive effect of
group size on cultural complexity [27-31] (but see [32, 33]). One study, for instance,
exposed naïve participants in groups of 2, 4, 8 and 16 to demonstrations showing
how to produce virtual arrowheads and fishing nets, and tracked the efficiency of
those tools  across time  [27].  The larger  the  group,  the less  likely  tools  were to
deteriorate, the more likely they were to improve, and the more likely a diversity of
tool types were to be maintained. Using chains of participants and alternative tasks
involving image-editing and knot-tying techniques, another study similarly showed

























larger groups  [29]. Additionally, these experiments  show that individuals use cues
such  as  success  to  choose  from  whom  they  learn,  lending  plausibility  to  the
assumption of  Henrich’s  model  that  individuals  selectively  learn  from successful
demonstrators. 
Importantly, some of these experiments relied on designs that only loosely
reflect Henrich’s initial assumptions (Box 2). Most, for instance, provide individuals
with the opportunity to simultaneously learn and combine information from multiple
demonstrators  (a  several-among-many  design)  [28-31] while  Henrich’s  model
assumes that individuals always select a single source of information from a larger
pool of demonstrators. Some experiments that have relied on the former design,
however,  allowed  participants  to  allocate  their  learning  time  strategically,  which
means that individuals’ learning strategies might still, in practice, be consistent with
Henrich’s assumptions  [29]. Yet mechanisms that are not part of Henrich’s model,
such  as  combining  information  from  multiple  demonstrators  to  generate  new
solutions,  certainly  did  play  a  role  in  these  experiments  [29-31].  Due  to  this
disconnect between experimental tests and theoretical models, it is not always clear
whether experimental studies showing positive effects of demography offer genuine
support for specific theoretical claims, nor whether purported failures to detect any
effect  of  demography  are  valid  challenges  to  theoretical  models  (see  Box 2  for
further discussion).


























A  complementary  and  more  direct  approach  to  test  the  relationship  between
population  size  and  CCE is  to  look  for a  correlation  between  toolkit  size  and
population size using real-world ethnographic and archaeological data. Results with
this approach have been mixed. Some studies support the hypothesis [13, 14, 34,
35], but others do not [36-39] (although [40] point out that some of these studies rely
on the same datasets, and should not count as independent tests). 
The difficulty with testing demographic models using real-world data is that
human populations are  typically  embedded within  extended networks of  cultural
exchange, making it difficult to gather meaningful estimates of population size. This
constitutes  a  major  obstacle  for  anthropologists  and  archaeologists  because
theoretical models explicitly link cultural complexity to the size of the population that
shares information (i.e. the effective cultural population size)  [11]. This implies that
tests of demographic hypotheses should control for contact rates between inter-
connected populations, which is typically challenging (but see [34]). Proponents of
demographic hypotheses have therefore argued that  studies  which reported null
results are invalid because they do not take contact rates into account and typically
treat culturally connected groups as independent, culturally isolated populations [40]
(see Box 3 for other mismatches between models and empirical tests). 
Other  studies  have  tested  demographic  effects  where  they  may  not  be
predicted  to  occur.  One  study,  for  instance,  found  no  evidence  that  larger
populations support  more complex folk tales,  with complexity operationalised as
number  of  tale  types,  number  of  narrative  motifs  within  tales,  and  number  of

























that is the focus of most demographic models. Tools that are more efficient and
have  higher  payoffs  are  typically  associated  with  an  increasing  number  of
component  elements  [42],  which  means  that  they  tend  to  be  more  complex.
However, if complexity is not associated with higher payoffs, then theoretical models
do  not  predict  that  population  size  should  necessarily  affect  it.  The  function  of
folktales, for instance, is to convey meaning. If similar meaning can be conveyed by
simpler folktales, we should not necessarily expect to observe the most complex
folktales in larger populations. The same line of reasoning applies to the evolution of
language, which functionally adapts to the needs of efficient communication  [43].
Studies that have investigated the relationship between speaker population sizes
and phoneme inventory  sizes  [44-46] or  rates  of  language change  [47-49] have
yielded mixed results.  However,  because language also evolves to become more
learnable [50], we should not necessarily expect larger populations to produce more
new words nor  have larger  phoneme inventory  size.  Furthermore,  folk  tales  and
other forms of expressive culture may serve as markers of group membership and
some  models  have  suggested  that  smaller  groups  will  have  more  exaggerated
markers  [51]. This suggests that a clearer picture about the relationship between
demography and the evolution of expressive cultural traits might emerge by moving
away from arbitrarily chosen measures of complexity and by taking into account that
functional and symbolic cultural traits exhibit different evolutionary dynamics [52].
It is also worth stressing that, contrary to recent claims  [53], no theoretical
work ever predicted that population size should solely determine the number of tools

























factors are expected to affect toolkit  complexity in natural  populations, including
mobility,  subsistence  practices  and  ecological  factors.  The  risk  hypothesis,  for
instance, holds that populations living in harsh environments create more numerous
and  specialised  tools  to  mitigate  the  risk  of  resource  failure  due  to  stochastic
variation  [36-39, 54, 55]. Importantly, the risk hypothesis and the population size
hypothesis differ in what they aim to explain [56]. The risk hypothesis explains what
determines the size and complexity of toolkits (i.e. what creates the need for cultural
complexity).  The population size hypothesis is about the constraints imposed on
CCE. Claims that the absence of correlation between population size and toolkit
complexity  disprove  demographic  models  are  based  on  misconceptions  about
those models (see Box 3).
Inconclusive studies about the relationship between population size and CCE
have had the merit of stimulating new work and led to important refinements to early
theoretical work. Models with different assumptions have shown that the effects of
effective population size hold when  more conservative or alternative assumptions
are  considered (e.g.  restricting  potential  demonstrators  to  a  limited  number  of
acquaintances  [57]; conformist transmission  [58, 59] but see  [60]; adding costs to
acquiring knowledge  [61];  and alternative pathways to innovation  [62]).  However,
recent studies also suggest that the relationship between effective population size
and CCE can be mediated by numerous factors ([58, 62-66]),  and that there are
numerous challenges in detecting demographic effects on CCE in real-world data
(see Box 3).

























of a population will alter the cultural information available to subsequent generations
of learners, which will most likely constrain what can be achieved by individuals. In
this  context,  promising  new  work  has  started  to  investigate  more  broadly  how
constraints on information flow within populations can further promote or hinder the
gradual accumulation of cultural innovations.  
Beyond numbers: CCE in social networks
Human populations do not consist of a collection of isolated groups of varying sizes.
Multiple  groups  are  typically  connected  by  migratory  and trade activities,  which
results in wide, heterogenous social networks. The role of connectedness on CCE
was already acknowledged in early theoretical models [11, 13].  A simulation model
that  explicitly  implemented  migratory  activity among subdivided populations,  for
instance, showed that increasing the migration rate has a similar effect to increasing
the size of an isolated population [13]. This is because increases in both population
size and migratory activity increase the effective number of individuals available as
demonstrators, and so reduce the risk of losing cultural information. 
More recent work, however, has started to  investigate in greater detail how
the structure of  the population impacts  the accumulation of  cultural  information.
Unlike early models, recent studies decouple the maintenance of existing traits and
the production of new traits, more explicitly modelling the pathways that give rise to
innovation [62, 67-69]. Recent models, for instance, assume that existing traits can
not  only  be  refined  but  also  combined  with  other  existing  cultural  traits.  When

























innovation,  increases  in  population  size  and  connectedness  can  have  different
effects  on  CCE  [68,  69].  This  is  because,  while  increases  in  population  size
systematically  benefit  CCE  by  reducing  the  risk  of  cultural  loss,  increases  in
connectedness can  reduce opportunities for innovation by homogenising cultural
behaviours. This effect is illustrated by a recent lab experiment in which individuals
could  innovate  by  producing  incremental  changes  within  path-dependent
technological  trajectories (refinement)  and by combining traits that have evolved
along different  trajectories  (recombination)  [67].  Results  show that  high  levels  of
connectedness make individuals more likely to converge on similar solutions, which
results in lower levels of cultural diversity and slower rates of innovation compared
with less connected groups. 
These results suggest that understanding the effect of demography on CCE
requires us to consider not only how changes in connectedness affect the number of
individuals available as demonstrators, but also how it shapes the cultural diversity
to  which  individuals  are  exposed.  When  these  two  effects  are  considered
simultaneously,  models show that optimal  rates of  accumulation are reached for
intermediate  levels  of  connectedness  [68,  69].  This  is  because  low  levels  of
connectedness  increase  the  risk  of  cultural  loss  by  decreasing  access  to
demonstrators, while high levels of connectedness reduce opportunities to innovate
by  homogenising  cultural  behaviours.  At  intermediate  levels  of  connectedness,
groups can accumulate cultural information while remaining culturally distinct, which
keeps fueling innovation. 

























microscale. At the macroscale, human population have been historically fragmented
due to geographic barriers,  conflicts and other factors, resulting in  long-standing
culturally  differentiated  sub-populations.  In  this  context,  increased  levels  of
between-group  connectedness  are  unlikely  to  homogenise  cultural  behaviours.
Nevertheless,  recent  models  suggest  that,  because  of  new  opportunities  for
recombination,  contacts  between  culturally  differentiated  groups  should  result  in
rapid cultural changes whose magnitude far exceed what is predicted by models
that  incorporate  cultural  loss  alone  [68].  This  also  suggests  that  population
structures that allow for contacts between culturally differentiated groups might act
as endogenous drivers of cultural  change  [67, 68],  even though it  should not be
assumed  that  populations  will  develop  and  maintain  more  complex  cultural
repertoires without appropriate incentives to do so (Box 3).
Patterns  of  connectedness  might  also  affect  CCE  at  the  microscale  by
influencing individuals’ exploration of the design space. Network and organization
scientists, for instance, have jointly shown that behaviours are more likely to become
homogeneous in well-connected than in partially-connected groups when learners
preferentially acquire information from the same demonstrator [70-72] (but see [73,
74]).  Sociologists  have  similarly  argued  that  behaviors  tend  to  be  more
homogeneous within groups than between groups and that  individuals with ties to
otherwise  unconnected groups  have greater  opportunities  to  develop new ideas
because they are exposed to a broader diversity of information [75]. 
These studies illustrate how patterns of connectedness impact the quantity

























make inferences,  which in  turn can impact  populations’  abilities  to  develop and
maintain cultural traits. The benefits of sparsely interconnected networks on CCE in
natural  populations,  however,  remain  to  be properly  evaluated.  Complex  cultural
traits  are  typically  hard  to  learn  and  several  experiments  have  stressed  the
importance  of  multiple  demonstrations  and  multiple  learning  attempts  in  the
acquisition  of  complex  skills  [27,  76].  This  suggests  that  occasional  contacts
between  different  individuals/groups  might  not  allow  complex  skills  to  spread
properly.  Additionally,  network  scientists  have  stressed  the  importance  of  the
number of sources of exposures for the adoption of unproven new solutions  [77].
Experiments  typically  provide  participants  with  accurate  information  about
alternative solutions, which allows them to confidently adopt the most rewarding
ones. In noisy environments, however, interactions with multiple carriers might be
critical for individuals to adopt alternative solutions [77] (see also [78] for an example
of how the mean number of  connections within a network affects the spread of
cultural  traits).  Future  research  should  test  whether  the  optimal  level  of
connectedness differs depending upon the characteristics of the cultural traits one is
looking at. Dense networks, for instance, might be critical for the cultural evolution
of hard to learn traits (for which transmission is the key bottleneck), while the cultural
evolution of easy to learn traits whose efficiency can be readily assessed might be
faster in sparsely connected networks.
Characterizing human social networks in the wild

























changes might be better understood by paying greater attention to the structure and
evolution of human social networks. Mapping past, or even recent, social networks,
however,  is challenging. Archaeologists and geneticists are still  struggling to infer
past  population sizes  [15,  79,  80],  let  alone population structures  [81].  In  recent
years,  approaches  relying  on  social  network  analyses  have  seen  a  rise  among
archaeologists,  but many challenges have still  to be solved before being able to
distinguish  spatio-temporal  patterns  in  social  interactions  from  noise  in
archaeological data [82-84]. 
Comparative  and  ethnographic  studies,  however,  are  already  providing
valuable  information  about  human  population  structure.  Comparisons  between
human hunter-gatherer  societies  and  non-human primate  societies,  for  instance,
have  shed  light  on  what  has  been  called  the  deep  social  structure  of  human
societies [85]. Contrary to most non-human primate societies, which are composed
of  independent,  single-group  structures,  human  societies  are  federations  of
multifamily  groups  [85,  86].  This  unique multigroup structure results  in  extensive
networks of  unrelated individuals that  might  be conducive to CCE  [87].  Data on
interactions  between  same-sex  adults  from two  hunter-gatherer  populations,  for
instance,  reveal  that  individuals  typically  interact  with  more  than  300  same-sex
adults in a lifetime (although including opposite-sex adults and children results in
estimates  as  high  as  1000).  In  comparison,  male  chimpanzees are  estimated  to
interact  with  only  about  20  other  males  in  a  lifetime  [87] (see  also  [88] for  a
discussion on the large-scale social networks of hunter-gatherer groups). 

























characterize  hunter-gatherer  networks.  One study,  for  instance,  used trackers  to
map  in-camp  networks  in  two  hunter-gatherer  populations  and  showed  that
individuals invest early in their childhood in a few close friends who bridge densely
connected families  [89]. These strong friendships increase the global efficiency of
hunter-gatherer  in-camp  networks,  which  might  facilitate  the  flow  of  social
information (Figure 2). More recently, characterization of hunter-gatherer networks
has been extended to between-camp interactions and has been used to simulate
the accumulation of cultural innovations over real networks [90]. Results confirm that
hunter-gatherers’  social  structures  are  made of  multiple  levels  of  clustering,  and
simulations suggest that this sparsely interconnected hierarchical network structure
might accelerate CCE by allowing the coexistence of multiple cultural lineages and
promoting the emergence of innovations (but see Box 4).
The few studies that have investigated networks in hunter-gatherers, however,
have been limited to interview data and proximity  measures  [87,  89,  90].  Actual
measurements  of  cultural  transmission  remain  scarce,  and  the  extent  to  which
proximity networks accurately reflect transmission networks is currently unknown.
Investigation of  the co-occurrence of  plant uses in dyads in one hunter-gatherer
population, for instance, showed that not all knowledge is equally shared [91]. More
specifically, results show that medicinal plants were mostly shared between spouses
and kin, while plants that serve other functions were shared much more widely. This
suggests that knowledge-sharing networks are content-specific and supports the
idea that hunter-gatherer multi-level social structure enables culturally differentiated

























that  both  structural  barriers (i.e.  lack  of  contact  between  individuals)  and
behavioral barriers (i.e. unwillingness to share cultural knowledge) have to be taken
into account to properly evaluate the effects of population structure on CCE. Indeed,
structural  and  behavioral  barriers  combine  to  result  in  an  effective  population
structure that ultimately determines opportunities for cultural transmission. Contact
between different ethnolinguistic groups, for instance, can potentially bring different
cultural traits together due to significant between-group cultural distance. However,
language barriers, endogamy, rivalry and other behavioural barriers such as in-group
conformity might limit opportunities for cultural exchange between those groups [92,
93]. 
These  results  suggest  that  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between
demography and CCE would benefit from a better understanding of how and why
individuals form social ties both within- and between-groups and the extent to which
different types of ties (such as kin-based, affine-based and friendship-based) are
conducive to cultural transmission. This will permit more realistic implementation of
cultural  transmission  into  theoretical  models.  Indeed,  while  the  combination  of
vertical cultural transmission (i.e. learning from parents) and success-biased learning
is empirically supported and provides a useful first approximation of the dynamics of
social learning in groups  [40], multiple factors are likely to affect opportunities for
social learning. Anthropological studies, for instance, have shown that social ties are
more likely to form between people who share similar traits (i.e. homophily [94, 95]).
Furthermore, understanding how individuals form social ties is an important avenue

























the evolution of social networks (homophily, for instance, is known to introduce local
structure into networks [95, 96]). 
How did human social networks get their shape? 
Even if  questions remain regarding the effects  of  specific network properties on
CCE, it seems clear that humans live within unusually large and uniquely structured
social networks. This raises questions about how and why humans have come to
form large networks of unrelated or weakly related individuals. 
Recently,  it  has  been  argued  that,  because  individuals  from  culturally
differentiated groups might have greatly benefited from increased between-group
interactions, selection might have acted at the individual level to affect individuals’
propensity  to  interact  with  out-group  members  [17].  This  might  have  involved
changes in conscious behavioural choices (e.g. adjustments to out-group contacts
due to perceived immediate benefits)  and/or unconscious influence on behaviour
(e.g.  decreased  fear  of  foreigners  or  tendency  to  disperse)  [17].  Congruently,  a
recent simulation model that investigated whether network structure itself can evolve
as  a  result  of  ecological  pressures  related  to  skill  acquisition  confirmed  that
selection can impact individuals’ propensity to form random ties (such as non kin
ties)  [97].  Yet, it  is not clear whether the acquisition of social information creates
sufficiently  strong  incentives  for  individuals  to  overcome  rivalry  and  other
behavioural  barriers  that  tend  to  reduce  opportunities  for  cultural  transmission
between unrelated individuals. Moreover, increasing contacts is only one part of the

























demonstrator’s willingness to share information [98-100].
Another  possible  way  by  which  selection  might  have  promoted  the
emergence of networks that are conducive to CCE is by acting on variation that
exists at the group level  [17, 101]. Indeed,  anthropologists have long stressed the
role of cultural  institutions in promoting both information sharing and interactions
between non-kin  [87,  101-103].  Among the Ache and Hadza,  for  instance,  ritual
relationships, mediated by activities such as club fight rituals, have been shown to
promote  inter-band  interaction.  Quantitative  analyses  have  revealed  that  ritual
relationship  is  a  more  important  predictor  than  kinship  for  different  types  of
interactions, including opportunities for cultural transmission (such as observing tool
making skills)  [87]. Furthermore, anthropologists have stressed that certain groups
have cultural beliefs that connect envy and harm, which make successful individuals
more  likely  to  hide  information  from other  group  members,  thus  inhibiting  CCE
compared to other groups  [101].  This suggests that groups that possess cultural
institutions that  promote information sharing and/or  mobility might  have attained
higher cultural complexity and outcompeted groups with cultures less conducive to
CCE  [17, 101].  It  is also worth noting that the maintenance of large networks of
unrelated or weakly related individuals might have been further supported by the
emergence of cultural innovations such as kin naming systems and stylistic markers
of group identity that typically promote cooperative interactions between unrelated
individuals [103].  Kin naming systems, for instance, allow familial  relationships to
extend to affine, distant kin and even non-kin [103] and might permit individuals to

























much cognitive effort nor physical cohabitation [104].
The question of whether humans’ social structure might in part result from
selection  pressures  linked  to  our  extensive  reliance  on  culturally  accumulated
knowledge will have to be carefully evaluated. Indeed, chimpanzees also live among
nonrelatives [105] and humans’ propensity to form ties with non-kin might be due to
reasons  unrelated  to  CCE  and  that  just  happened  to  be  conducive  to  the
accumulation  of  cultural  innovations.  Archeologists,  for  instance,  noted  that  an
incest  avoidance  rule  would  give  rise  to  the  same  kind  of  sparsely  connected
networks that might benefit CCE [56]. Alternative determinants of outgroup contacts
include  resource  distribution  [56],  reciprocal  cooperative  exchange  [106] and
coalition formation  [107], among others. Specific predictions should be formulated
and  properly  tested  to  disentangle  the  respective  effects  of  these  various
mechanisms on network structure. The hypothesis that CCE directly shapes network
structure by acting on  conscious behavioural choices, for instance, would predict
that individuals should flexibly reinforce or weaken their investment in non-kin ties
depending on the usefulness of the information they provide. 
Concluding remarks and future directions
The  proliferation  of  work  exploring  the  interplay  of  demography  and  CCE  has
recently led to many misconceptions due to loose interpretations of early theoretical
models (Box 2 and 3). Empirical tests that operationalize models in ways that are
consistent  with  theoretical  assumptions  provide  support  for  the  hypothesis  that

























world data remains difficult because multiple  factors combine with demography to
determine CCE and human populations are  typically  embedded within  extended
networks of cultural exchange. While these extended networks of contacts make it
difficult to gather meaningful estimates of population size, recent research suggests
that  they  might  also  affect  CCE  in  ways  that  are  not  yet  fully  appreciated.
Understanding how population structure affects CCE will require us to  understand
precisely how structural and behavioral barriers constrain information flow in natural
populations (Box 4).
The  effects  of  connectedness  on the  accumulation  of  cultural  information
raise  many  questions  about  the  relationship  between  humans’  unique  social
structure and CCE (see Outstanding Questions). Through the study of the nature and
the emergence of non-kin ties, both within groups and between groups, as well as
knowledge-sharing networks in natural populations, it will be possible to illuminate
how  humans  have  managed  to  accumulate  cultural  information  in  such  an
unprecedented way and determine whether our  unique social  structure results in




















Box 1: Demographic models of cultural change
Cultural  drift.  Some of  the earliest  cultural  evolution  models  adapted  early  20 th
century models of genetic drift to the cultural case  [8, 22, 23, 108]. Drift, whether
genetic  or  cultural,  is  essentially  sampling  error.  Drift  models  typically  assume
‘unbiased transmission’ or ‘random copying’: each of N individuals within a finite
and fixed-sized population possesses one of a set of discrete cultural traits. Each
generation or timestep, individuals select another individual at random and acquire
their cultural trait. This process results in the inevitable loss of trait variation. The
speed  with  which  traits  are  lost  is  dependent  on  N:  smaller  populations  lose
variation quicker. This is a highly simplistic model, but provides a useful base for
exploring  the  effects  of  processes  such  as  innovation  and  complex  population
structures  such as  island chains or  bottlenecks on CCE,  and has been used to
explain archaeological assemblage diversity [22, 108].
The  ‘Tasmanian’  model.  Perhaps  the  most  influential  demographic  model  of
cultural evolution was formulated by Henrich  [11]. This model was inspired by the
empirical case of prehistoric Tasmania, which apparently lost complex technological
traits (e.g. bone tools, warm clothing) around 10-12kya when Tasmania was cut off
from the Australian mainland, thus decreasing the effective population size [20]. The
model  incorporates  more  psychologically  plausible  processes  than  simple  drift
models. Each of N individuals possesses a value of culturally transmitted ‘skill’ (e.g.
basket-making),  represented  by  a  continuous  variable  z.  Each  timestep,  each

























previous timestep,  h  (i.e. success biased transmission). Learning is imperfect, and
affected by two kinds of processes. Learning error, determined by ɑ, always results
in worse skill  than  zh.  Another parameter,  β, determines the extent of inferences,
experiments, luck and other factors that on average make skill  levels worse, but
sometimes better,  than  zh.  Combining these, Henrich assumed that the skill  of a
naive individual is drawn from a Gumbel distribution (Figure 1). N interacts with the
latter β term: the more individuals there are, the more likely one of those individuals
is to exceed zh, representing an increase in cumulative cultural knowledge/skill. If N
is too small, then all learners will acquire values around the mode of the distribution,
which is  less than  zh,  resulting in  a  decrease in  cultural  complexity.  Subsequent
empirical  work  has  shown  that  this  Gumbel  distribution  is  a  reasonable
approximation of social learning dynamics [109] (but see [110] for a critique of this
model).
Population structure and trait recombination. Subsequent models have extended
the  Tasmanian  model  to  investigate  in  greater  detail  how  the  structure  of  the
population  impacts  both  the  maintenance  and  the  production  of  cultural  traits.
Stochastic simulations of the Tasmanian model with multiple sub-populations show
that  increasing the migration rate has a  similar effect to increasing the size of an
isolated population on CCE, because both increase variation within sub-populations
and so reduce the risk of losing cultural information [13]. Recent studies have more
explicitly modelled the pathways that give rise to innovation and revealed that the

























to form innovations that are “greater than the sum of their parts” [68]. However, too
frequent contact might not be beneficial  to CCE because it  prevents populations
from remaining culturally distinct, and reduces opportunities to innovate [68, 69]. 
Figure 1: Gumbel distribution from Henrich’s Tasmanian model
The distributions depict  the probability of a learner  i acquiring different values of
skill, z (zi), for two different population sizes N. The vertical dotted line shows the z
value  of  the  highest-skilled  demonstrator  being  copied  (zh).  Learning  error,
determined by ɑ, reduces the likelihood of zh being reached. Inferences, experiments
and luck, determined by β, increase the chances of the learner improving on zh (the













draws from each distribution, representing N learners’ zi values. Red bars represent
inferior zi relative to zh, green bars represent superior zi relative to zh. On the left, a
small population (N=20) results in a population-level decline in skill, as no learner
matches  or  exceeds  zh.  On  the  right,  a  large  population  (N=100)  features  some







Box 2: Linking models and data in the lab
Experimental  approaches  are  useful  for  investigating  the  relationship  between
demography and CCE because essential  elements  of  theoretical  models  can be
implemented under tightly controlled conditions, and tested against actual human
behaviour (rather than modellers’ assumptions about human behaviour) [111, 112].
As noted in the main text, the majority of experimental studies have found
support for the general predictions of demographic models [27-31]. This is all the
more  surprising  given  that  these  studies  are  remarkably  diverse  in  experimental
tasks, group sizes and inter-individual interactions. Yet, it is worth highlighting that
most experimental designs significantly deviate from the models they claim to test.
In the main text we discuss one example, where experiments offer social learners
the opportunity to combine information from multiple cultural demonstrators [29-31],
rather  than  learn  from  a  single  successful  demonstrator  as  in  the  most-cited
demographic models (see Box 1). The role of recombination across existing cultural
traits has been stressed by scholars from multiple fields  [113-115], and increased
opportunities  for  recombination  certainly  is  one  pathway  by  which  effective
population size might  affect  CCE  [101].  Yet,  most  experiments are  presented as
tests of  models that do not feature recombination between existing traits and in
which effective population size mostly affects CCE by  buffering the risk of losing
cultural information (see Box 1). Still other experiments have relied on tasks in which
cultural loss is unlikely to occur [31]. Thus, even though these experiments support
the  population  size  hypothesis,  it  is  not  always  clear  whether  they  provide

























Maybe  more  problematic  are  experiments  where  results  showing  no
relationship between  demography  and CCE are  used to  question  the  validity  of
theoretical models despite featuring different assumptions to those models. A recent
experiment,  for  instance,  had  chains  of  participants  make  and  throw  paper
airplanes, with each participant able to learn from 1, 2 or 4 previous participants
[33].  Apparently  contrary  to  the  demographic  hypothesis,  flight  distance  only
increased  in  the  1-demonstrator  condition,  not  the  2-  and  4-demonstrator
conditions. Yet this experimental design prevented participants from learning from
the  demonstrator  of  their  choice.  Instead  participants  were  forced  to  attend  to
multiple,  randomly  ordered  demonstrators  for  1.5  minutes  each.  Yet,  Henrich’s
model explicitly holds that it is the combination of the amount of beneficial cultural
information (which increases in larger groups) and the selective choices of cultural
learners that promotes CCE. Fay et al.’s results are consistent with the former in
showing that  larger  groups  produce greater  variation  in  distance flight  and give
participants access to more efficient planes. But the constraints imposed on social
learning strategies inhibited CCE in large groups by making learning more difficult in
those groups. 
Discrepancies between experiments and models are not inherently a problem:
the assumptions of models can always be challenged and mechanisms other than
those considered in theoretical models are worth investigating. Yet, the experimental
literature  would  benefit  from  being  more  explicit  about  the  theoretical  basis




























Box 3: Linking models and data in the wild
Several studies have investigated whether there exists a correlation between toolkit
size or composition and population size  in natural populations [13, 14, 34-39], but
there remain serious challenges in testing demographic effects on CCE in real world
data. 
One  difficulty concerns limitations in what can be measured  [58]. Henrich’s
model (see Box 1) describes the level of skill of an individual within a population, a
variable that in an archaeological context can be interpreted as the number of tools
or tool components attributable to an individual. Yet, archaeological studies typically
only have access to population-level rather than individual-level data. This makes
purported tests that use population-level assemblage measures largely irrelevant to
Henrich’s predictions [58]. Even though a recent model incorporating the appropriate
population-level  variable  does predict  a  positive  relationship between population
size and toolkit size [58], these discrepancies illustrate the need to use appropriate
measures when attempting to test a model and/or to adapt models so they can
properly be tested using empirical data.
A  second  difficulty  is  that  demography  has  multiple  aspects  that  can  be
difficult to fully take into account in ethnographic and archaeological studies. In the
main text we discuss one example of this, where empirical data regarding census
population sizes are used to test (and purportedly fail  to support)  the Tasmanian
model  without  taking  contact  rates  into  account.  Furthermore,  recent  models
suggest  that  historical  variations  in  population  size  and  connectedness  are  as

























a population [58, 64, 68]. Some models, for instance, show that the number of traits
in a population should depend not only on the current population size but also on
the history of population growth and decline [58, 64]. This can blur the relationship
between population size and CCE because growing populations can have fewer
cultural traits than smaller, declining populations. Similarly, two populations of the
same  size  might  be  associated  with  toolkits  of  different  sizes  due  to  different
demographic trajectories. Models also suggest that changes in interconnectedness
can result in different outcomes including transient increases in cultural complexity
[68].  The effects  of  population  histories  represent  a  challenge for  archaeologists
whose data represent a record of aggregated events spanning long periods of time
during  which  both  population  size  and  interconnectedness  might  have  varied.
Further models are needed to determine what testable signatures these dynamics
might have left in the past for archaeologists and historians to detect.
Finally,  demographic  factors  determine  an  upper  boundary  to  the  level  of
cultural  complexity  that  can  be  reached  by  a  population,  but  do  not  entirely
determine the actual level reached by a population. Assuming that increased cultural
complexity is beneficial,  increases in population size should result in increases in
cultural  complexity  but  only  because  this  relaxes  constraints  on  CCE.  A  full
understanding  of  CCE  in  natural  populations  requires  both  drivers  of  CCE  and
constraints  to  be  taken  into  account.  To  that  end,  more  research  is  needed  to
identify  the  factors  that  combine  with  demography  to  determine CCE in  natural
populations,  such  as  environmental  harshness  [54] and  instability  [116] or

























Box 4: Is human multilevel social structure beneficial to CCE? 
Recent theoretical and experimental studies have challenged the assumption that
anything that  maximizes the flow of  cultural  information should positively impact
innovation rates (Figure 2A-B). These results have led scholars to wonder whether
CCE in human populations has benefited from our unique multilevel social structure
via the partial constraints it imposes on information flow  [67]. A recent simulation
study  provided  support  for  this  by  showing  that  real  hunter-gatherers’  social
networks allow  the coexistence of  multiple  cultural  lineages,  thus promoting the
emergence of innovations [90]. 
However,  while  characterizing  actual  networks  is  useful  for  understanding
how  cultural  information  is  expected  to  spread,  many  (still  largely  unknown)
parameters need to be taken into account before establishing whether, and if so
why, human multilevel social structure promotes CCE. Previous work has shown, for
instance, that the effect of network structure on CCE is mediated by factors such as
individuals’  probabilities  of  innovating  (because  even  strong  constraints  on
information flow prevent cultural diversification if innovation rates are low [69]) and
the extent to which innovation depends on cultural diversity (because constraints on
information flow both slow down and limit CCE when innovation does not depend
on recombination [69]). In the aforementioned simulation study [90], both individuals’
opportunity to innovate, and possibilities for recombination, were determined by the
properties  of  an  artificial  cultural  fitness  that  was  designed to  permit  innovation
through incremental  improvement and recombination  [67], but whose relevance to

























Maybe more importantly, the effect of network structure on cultural loss was
not  considered  in  those  simulations  [90].  When  cultural  loss  is  not  taken  into
account,  constraints  on  information  flow  necessarily  benefit  CCE  by  promoting
cultural diversification. In more realistic situations, constraints on information flow
expose  populations  to  higher  rates  of  cultural  loss,  which  can  prevent  cultural
diversification  [119].  Moreover,  even  if  they  have  diverse  cultural  repertoires,
sparsely  connected  populations  can  be  unlikely  to  reach  high  levels  of  cultural
complexity because of their inability to maintain complex cultural traits [69].  Thus,
given  our  current  limited  knowledge  about  rates  of  loss  and  innovation,  and
opportunities for recombination, in real-world populations, it is not clear whether the
network structure  documented in  [90] positively  affects  CCE or  whether  cultural
complexity in hunter-gatherer populations would benefit from more connectedness
by being less susceptible to cultural loss. Answering this question will  require an
evaluation of how sparse networks made of strong ties (e.g. kin and friendship ties)

















Figure  2:  Trading  cultural  loss  and  diversity  in  structured  populations. (A)
Experimental  results  show that  moderately  connected  populations  are  slower  at
accumulating innovations but eventually reach higher levels of cultural complexity
than highly connected populations when innovation depends on cultural diversity.
Adapted from [67]. (B) Simulation models show that  optimal rates of accumulation
are reached for intermediate levels of connectedness when populations are exposed
to  cultural  loss. Relative  rates  of  accumulation  between  variously  connected
populations depend on parameters such as rates of innovation and cultural  loss,
and  the  extent  to  which  innovation  depends  on  cultural  diversity  (not  shown).
Adapted  from  [69].  (C)  Patterns  of  connectedness  affect  both  cultural  loss  and













average number of steps required to connect any two individuals (i.e. path length) is
minimal and the efficiency with which information spreads is maximal. This reduces
the risks of cultural but decreases cultural diversity. (ii) Removing ties increases the
average path length between individuals and results in less efficient networks (e.g.
from i  to  ii).  (iii)  Networks  composed of  individuals  tied to  the  same number  of
neighbors  can  also  vary  in  efficiency  due  to  differences  in  average  clustering
coefficients  (a  measure  that  reflects  the  “cliquishness”  of  a  network  [120]).
Increasing the average clustering coefficient results in less efficient networks (e.g.
from ii to iii). (iv) Intermittent links between different parts of a network (dotted lines)
further constrain information flow and result in substructures that are more likely to
culturally diverge by isolation (illustrated by different colors) but also more likely to















Demography: the size and structure of a population of individuals within which CCE
occurs
Cumulative cultural evolution (CCE): the repeated modification and social learning
of behavioural traits from individual to individual and over successive generations,
such that the cultural traits improve in some desired measure of efficiency (typically
a proxy for fitness)
Innovation: the  generation  of  novel  cultural  variation,  either  via  refinement  or
recombination
Refinement: improving an existing cultural trait, typically through a small, gradual
change
Recombination: the  bringing  together  of  existing  cultural  traits  to  form  a  new
functional trait
Tasmanian model: an influential early model of how population size constrains CCE
(see Box 1)
Cultural  drift: cultural  change  due  to  random  sampling  error,  which  is  heavily

























Structural  barriers: blocks  on  information  flow  due  to  the  structure  of  the
population, e.g. individuals simply not coming into contact with one another
Behavioural  barriers:  blocks on information  flow due to  behavioural  tendencies
such as an unwillingness to teach hard-to-learn skills, despite contact
Effective population structure: the structure, resulting from the combined effects
of structural and behavioral barriers, that constraints the flow of cultural information
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